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Abstract
We provide for the first time an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for
k- price auctions. We also introduce a generalization of the second price auction that
maintains the incentive to bid truthfully, therefore paving the way for replacing second
price auctions.
key words : Vickrey auctions, k- price auctions, Combination-auctions, game theory
1 Introduction
Second price auctions, also known as Vickrey auctions [8], are well known and largely used as
examples in online or Government auctions because it gives bidders an incentive to bid their
true value. Nevertheless, second price auctions have reached some limits because, inter alia,
bidders bid insincerely and the variance of the winning bid often has a large value.
A natural generalization of second price auctions is the k-price auction, which has been
studied by many researchers in the recent years. The reader can refer to [1, 2, 9] for related
literature and [3]. In particular, Roger B. Myerson [5] established the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem (known as RET theorem) in 1981, which characterized the equilibrium strategy. Later
in 1998, Monderer and Tenenholtz [4] proved the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in
k-price auctions for k = 3. Under some regularity assumptions, they also provided sufficient
conditions for the existence of the equilibrium. In 2000, Wolfsteller [10] solved the equilibrium
k-price auctions for a uniform distribution and in 2014, Nawar and Sen [6] generalized the result
of Wolfsteller, and provided a derivation expression of the k-price auctions bidding equilibrium
for a quadratic distribution.
In this paper, we prove two major results. First, in Theorem 3.1, we generalized Wolfsteller
and Nawar results by giving a closed form solution of the equilibrium of the k-price auctions in
a general case. The solution takes an easy form which is easily calculable. As applications, this
simplifies the discussions of the existence and uniqueness, and we can calculate the equilibrium
for classical distributions and recover certain known results.
Secondly, we extend the notion of k- price auctions by introducing a new type of auction that
we will call a "Combination-auctions": the winner pays a centroid of the bids. In fact a natural
question is: Are there other combinations that second price auction which lead to a truthful
equilibrium? We demonstrate in Theorem 4.1 that there exists combinations other than the
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second price auction leading to a truthful equilibrium.These new strategies could replace second
price auction... Then we show in Theorem 4.2 that if there exists truthful strategies other than
the second price auctions, then the distribution of the valuations of the bidders is a uniform
distribution.
We also provide an alternative proof of the RET theorem with probability tools, which does
not involve advanced auctions theory and game theory knowledge.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we state the assumptions and re-establish
the RET theorem with a probability approach. Next, we solve the equilibrium and discuss the
uniqueness and the existence, together with applications for classical distributions. Finally, in
Section 4 we introduce the "Combination-auctions" and discuss strategies other than second
price auctions which are truthful.
2 Problem formulation and assumptions
In this section we present our assumptions and re-establish the RET theorem. The RET the-
orem is established in [5] by Roger B. Myerson. The original proof involves heavy advanced
auctions theory and game theory insight. Here we provide an alternative approach, with prob-
ability tools. With our approach, one can extend the RET theorem for "Combination-autions",
which we will introduce in Section 4.
The k- price auction problem can be formulated as follows: consider a k-price auctions with
n bidders, where the highest bidder wins, and pays only the k-th highest bid. Let’s assume
that k > 2 and n 6 k. We make the assumptions following [7]:
1. The valuations Vi, i = 1, · · · , n of the bidders are independent and identically distributed
with distribution function F .
2. The distribution function F is with values in I where I = [0, 1] or I = R+.
We also assume that:
(A) F is k − 2 times continuously differentiable and ∀x ∈ I F ′(x) > 0.
We remark that for analysis of the 3-price auction in the literature, the existence and the
continuity of the density function are often assumed. It is thus natural to assume (A) holds for
the case of general k-price auctions. We also assume that each bidder bids Xi = g(Vi) where g
is a strictly increasing function. It follows that the bids Xi are independent variables and we
denote their distribution function Fˆ and their density fˆ . As g is strictly increasing, Fˆ is also
strictly increasing on g(I).
For n−1 bidders which bid X1, ..., Xn−1, we denote Yn−1 = max(X1, ..., Xn−1) and Yn−2 the
second maximum. In general ∀p 6 n− 1, Yn−p is the p-th maximum.
Now we recall the RET theorem for the k-price auctions (see also [4]):
Theorem 2.1 (RET theorem). Let k > 3. A risk-neutral strategy g is an equilibrium strategy
in the k-price auction if and only if the following two conditions hold:
1. g is strictly increasing in the interval [0, 1].
2. It holds for all x ∈ [0, 1]:
∫ x
t=0
(x− g(t))F (t)n−k(F (x)− F (t))k−3F ′(t)dt = 0.
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2.1 An alternative approach of RET theorem
This section provides a probability approach of RET theorem. Before proving the theorem, we
first show several lemmas with algebra computation.
Lemma 2.2. For all t 6 x and (t, x) ∈ I2, denote
H(t) := P([Yn−p+1 6 t] ∩ [Yn−1 6 x]).
Then it holds
H(t) =
k−2∑
p=0
Fˆ (t)n−1−p(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))p (1)
and
H ′(t) =
(n− 1)!
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
Fˆ n−k(t)(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))k−2 (2)
Proof. It holds for all t 6 x (t, x) ∈ I2:
P (Yn−p+1 6 t ∩ Yn−1 6 x) =P (X1, ..., Xn−1 6 t)
+
(
n− 1
1
)
P (X1, ..., Xn−2 6 t ∩Xn−1 ∈]t, x])
+ ...+
(
n− 1
p− 2
)
P (X1, ..., Xn−p+1 6 t ∩Xn−p+2, ..., Xn−1 ∈]t, x])
And equation (1) follows according to the fact that Xi are independently identically dis-
tributed.
Now we prove equation (2). Derive equation (1), it follows:
H ′(t) = fˆ(t)

k−2∑
p=0
(
n− 1
p
)
(n− 1− p)Fˆ (t)n−2−p(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))p
−
k−2∑
p=1
(
n− 1
p
)
pFˆ (t)n−1−p(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))p−1
) (3)
Then
H ′(t) = fˆ(t)

k−2∑
p=0
(
n− 1
n− 1− p
)
(n− 1− p)Fˆ (t)n−2−p(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))p
−
k−3∑
p=0
(
n− 1
p+ 1
)
(p+ 1)Fˆ (t)n−2−p(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))p
) (4)
A telescopic sum appears and after simplification we get:
H ′(t) =
(n− 1)!
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
Fˆ n−k(t)(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))k−2fˆ(t),
which is exactly equation (2).
Lemma 2.3. For all p,m ∈ N, it holds:∫ 1
0
(1− u)pumdu =
p!m!
(p+m+ 1)!
. (5)
For n > k > 2, it holds:
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2−p
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)
=
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 1)!
. (6)
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Proof. The equation (5) is direct from integration by parts. We now prove equation (6). for
n > k > 2, denote
A =
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2−p
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)
Consider
r(x) =
k−2∑
p=0
(−x)n−2−p
(
k − 2
p
)
= (−1)n−kxn−k(1− x)k−2.
Now let
R(x) =
∫ x
0
r(u)du.
Observe that
R(1) = (−1)n−k+1A
and according to equation (5), it holds
R(1) = (−1)n−k+1
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 1)!
hence
A =
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 1)!
=
1
(n− 1)
(
n−2
k−2
) .
Now we are ready to prove the RET Theorem.
Proof. We consider here n − 1 bidders which play with the same rule Xi = g(Vi). The payoff
expression of the n-th bidder for a valuation v and a bid x is:
U(x, v) =
∫ x
0
(v − t)H ′(t)dt =
∫ x
0
(v − t)
(n− 1)!
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
Fˆ n−k(t)(Fˆ (x)− Fˆ (t))k−2fˆ(t)dt (7)
The goal is at v fixed to find x = g(v) which maximizes the payoff.
By developing (7) we find:
U(x, v) =
(n− 1)!
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2−p
(
k − 2
p
)
Fˆ p(x)
∫ x
0
(v − t)Fˆ n−2−p(t)fˆ(t)dt
And then
∂U
∂x
(x, v) = 0
is equivalent to
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2−p
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)(
(n− 1)(v − x)Fˆ n−2(x) + pFˆ p−1(x)
∫ x
0
Fˆ n−1−p(t)dt
)
= 0. (8)
Now let g1 be the quantile function of the distribution X, i.e. g1 = Fˆ
−1. As Fˆ is strictly
increasing, g1 exists and differentiable almost everywhere. Let denote Fˆ (x) = a and q the
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quantile function of F . Thus, X = g(V ) implies that a = Fˆ (x) = F (v), therefore we have
v = q(a). Equality (8) becomes
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2−p
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)(
(n− 1)(q(a)− g1(a))a
n−2 + pap−1
∫ a
0
un−1−pg′1(u)du
)
= 0. (9)
Observe that
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)
pap−1
∫ a
0
un−1−pg′1(u) du
=
∫ a
0

k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)
pap−1un−1−p

 g′1(u) du
=
∫ a
0
P (a, u)g′1(u) du,
where
P (a, u) =
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2
n− 1− p
(
k − 2
p
)
pap−1un−1−p.
Since, n > k, we deduce that n−1−p > 0 for p ∈ [0, k−2]. Thus for all a ∈ R, P (a, 0) = 0.
Denote ∂a the derivation operator with respect to a and ∂u the derivation operator with
respect to u. It holds:
∂uP (a, u) =
k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2
(
k − 2
p
)
pap−1un−2−p
=

k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2
(
k − 2
p
)
pap−1uk−2−p

un−k
= ∂a

k−2∑
p=0
(−1)k−2
(
k − 2
p
)
apuk−2−p

un−k
= ∂a
(
(a− u)k−2
)
un−k
= (k − 2)(a− u)k−3un−k.
Therefore, applying integration by parts and observing that P (0, 0) = 0, it follows that
∫ a
0
P (a, u)g′1(u)du = [P (a, u)g1(u)]
a
0 −
∫ a
0
∂uP (a, u)g1(u)du
= P (a, a)g1(a)−
∫ a
0
(p− 2)(a− u)k−3un−kg1(u)du.
According to lemma 2.3
P (a, a) =
∫ a
0
(k − 2)(a− u)k−3un−k du
= (k − 2)an−2
∫ 1
0
(1− u)k−3un−kdu
= an−2
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
.
The latter equality together with equation (5) leads to
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(q(a)−g1(a))a
n−2 (n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
+an−2
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
g1(a) =
∫ a
0
(k−2)(a−u)k−3un−kg1(u)du
(10)
which is equivalent to
q(a)an−2
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
=
∫ a
0
(k − 2)(a− u)k−3un−kg1(u)du. (11)
Notice that the latter equation can be also written as:
q(a)P (a, a) =
∫ a
0
(k − 2)(a− u)k−3un−kg1(u)du,
rearranging the terms, it holds:∫ a
0
(k − 2)(a− u)k−3un−k(g1(u)− q(a))du = 0.
Let x = q(a) and change the variable u = F (t) inside the integration, together with the fact
that g1(u) = Fˆ
−1 ◦ F (t) = g(t), we obtain:
∫ x
0
(k − 2)(F (x)− F (t))k−3F (t)n−k(g(t)− x)F ′(t)dt = 0.
The proof is completed.
3 Analysis of equilibrium
In this section, we first give a closed form solution of the equilibrium for k- price auctions,
k > 3. Then with the solution, we analyze the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. At
the end of this section we provide some examples.
3.1 Solution of the equilibrium
Theorem 3.1. We assume that (A) holds, then the equilibrium satisfies equation (11). More-
over, equation (11) has unique solution:
g1(a) =
ak−n(n− k)!
(n− 2)!
(
q(a)an−2
)(k−2)
=
(q(a)an−2)
(k−2)
(an−2)(k−2)
. (12)
Proof. We denote for p > 0
Ap(a, u) = (a− u)
pun−kg1(u)
and
Gp(a, u) =
∫ a
0
(a− u)pun−kg1(u).
It holds :
A0(a, a) = a
n−kg1(a),
G0(a, u) =
∫ a
0
un−kg1(u) =
∫ a
0
A0(a, u)du,
and for p > 1:
Ap(a, a) = 0,
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For p > 1 and for all a ∈ [0, 1]:
G′p(a) = lim
h→0
1
h
(∫ a+h
0
Ap(a+ h, u)du−
∫ a
0
Ap(a, u)du
)
= lim
h→0
1
h
(∫ a+h
0
Ap(a+ h, u)du−
∫ a
0
Ap(a + h, u)du+
∫ a
0
Ap(a + h, u)− Ap(a, u)du
)
= Ap(a, a) + lim
h→0
1
h
(∫ a
0
Ap(a+ h, u)− Ap(a, u)du
)
= Ap(a, a) +
∫ a
0
∂aAp(a, u)du
= (p− 1)Gp−1(a)
We remark that for all b ∈ I,
∫ b
0 |g1(u)|du 6 bg1(b) holds, thus we can switch the integral
and the limit in the previous formula. Therefore calculation is valid.
Therefore, the (p+ 1)th derivative of Gp on a is
G(p+1)p (a) = (p− 1)!G
′
0(a) = (p− 1)!A0(a, a) = (p− 1)!a
n−kg1(a). (13)
Hence, the (k − 2)th derivative of equation(11) gives
(
q(a)an−2
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
)(k−2)
= (k − 2)
(∫ a
0
(a− u)k−3un−kg1(u)du
)(k−2)
= (k − 2)G
(k−2)
k−3 (a)
= (k − 2)!an−kg1(a).
Rearranging the terms, we have
g1(a) =
ak−n(n− k)!
(n− 2)!
(
q(a)an−2
)(k−2)
=
(q(a)an−2)
(k−2)
(an−2)(k−2)
.
Since equation (11) has a unique solution, according to RET theorem, the equilibrium exists
if and only if (q(a)an−2)
(k−2)
/(an−2)(k−2) is strictly increasing.
3.2 Examples
As applications, we introduce several examples. With the formula from previous section, one
can easily recover some classical results.
Example 3.1 (Uniform distribution). q(a) = a, g(v) = g1(a).
g(v) = g1(a) =
ak−n(n− k)!
(n− 2)!
(
q(a)an−2
)(k−2)
=
ak−n(n− k)!
(n− 2)!
(
an−1
)(k−2)
=
n− 1
n− k + 1
a =
n− 1
n− k + 1
v
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Example 3.2 (3-price auctions). For k = 3, notice that q′(a) = F−1
′
(a) = 1/F ′(v), it follows
that:
g(v) = g1(a) =
a3−n
(n− 2)
(
q(a)an−2
)
′
= q(a) +
1
n− 2
aq′(a)
= v +
1
n− 2
F (v)
F ′(v)
and we found the well known result.
Example 3.3 ( 4-price auctions). . For k = 4, since
q′(a) =
1
F ′(v)
=
1
F ′(q(a))
,
it follows that
q′′(a) = −
F ′′(q(a))
F ′2(q(a)
q′(a) = −
F ′′(v)
F ′3(v)
.
Then it holds :
g1(a) =
a4−n
(n− 2)(n− 3)
(
q(a)an−2
)
′′
=
a4−n
(n− 2)(n− 3)
(
(n− 2)(n− 3)an−4q(a) + 2(n− 2)an−3q′(a) + an−2q′′(a)
)
= q(a) +
2
n− 3
a
F ′(q(a))
−
1
(n− 2)(n− 3)
a2F ′′(q(a))
F ′(q(a))3
Finally, with with v = q(a) and a = F (v):
g(v) = v +
2
n− 3
F (v)
F ′(v)
−
1
(n− 2)(n− 3)
F 2(v)F ′′(v)
F ′(v)3
We recover the result of [6], Theorem 2.
Example 3.4 (polynomial distribution). . For F (x) := xα with α > 0, then q(a) = a1/α and
g(v) = g1(a) =
ak−n(n− k)!
(n− 2)!
(
q(a)an−2
)(k−2)
=
ak−n(n− k)!
(n− 2)!
(
an−2+1/α
)(k−2)
=
Γ(n− k + 1)Γ(n− 1 + 1/α)
Γ(n− k + 1 + 1/α)Γ(n− 1)
a1/α
=
Γ(n− k + 1)Γ(n− 1 + 1/α)
Γ(n− k + 1 + 1/α)Γ(n− 1)
v
where Γ is the Gamma function. In particular, if α = 1
m
where m is a positive integer,
g(v) =
(n− 2 +m)...(n− k +m+ 1)
(n− 2)...(n− k + 1)
v
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4 Combination-price auctions
In this section we start by defining a new type of auction that we call a Combination-price
auction. We demonstrate that a Combination-price auction could be truthful for linear combi-
nations other than second price auctions (α2 = 1), giving some companies an incentive to use
it instead of second price auctions. Moreover, we will characterize the distributions for which
there exists a linear combination different from α2 = 1 which is truthful.
4.1 Nash equilibrium of Combination-price auctions
We call Combination-price auctions an auction in which the winner will pay a linear combination
of the prices bid by the bidders: α1Yn + ... + αsYn−s+1 where all the αk are positive satisfying∑s
k=1 αk = 1.
Like in the first part, we consider here n−1 bidders which play with the same ruleXi = g(Vi).
Reasoning as in Section 2, the payoff expression for the n-th bidder for a valuation v and a bid
x can be expressed as a multiple integral:
U(x, v) =
∫∫ x
0
(x−
s∑
k=1
αktk)P (Yn−1 ∈ [t1, t1+dt1]∩...∩Yn−s+1 ∈ [ts, ts+dts]∩Yn−1 6 x)dt1...dts.
Together with
∑s
k=1 αk = 1 we can write:
U(x, v) =
s∑
k=1
αk
∫∫ x
0
(x−tk)P (Yn−1 ∈ [t1, t1+dt1]∩...∩Yn−s+1 ∈ [ts, ts+dts]∩Yn−1 6 x)dt1...dts
then:
U(x, v) =
s∑
k=1
αkUk(x, v)
where Uk is the payoff of the k-price auctions.
Now combining equation (11) with a simple calculation of U1 and U2, we deduce that g1 is
a Nash equilibrium for the combination-price auctions if and only if g1 is increasing and the
following equation holds:
q(a)an−2
(
s∑
k=2
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
αp
)
− α1a
n−1
=α1(n− 1)
q(a)− g1(a)
g′1(a)
an−2 + α2a
n−2g1(a) +
∫ a
0
g1(u)
(
s∑
k=3
αk(k − 2)(a− u)
k−3un−k
)
du.
(14)
4.2 Study of truthful equilibrium
The following theorem characterizes the truthful equilibrium for uniform distribution.
Theorem 4.1. If the distribution is uniform, there are an infinite number of linear combina-
tions which lead to a truthful strategy.
More precisely, adapting the notations before, a Combination-price auction is truthful if and
only if the coefficients (αi) satisfy the following conditions:
1. It holds
α1 =
s∑
k=3
(k − 3)!(n− k)!(2k − n− 3)
(n− 2)!
αk,
2. for all k, αk > 0, and
s∑
k=1
αk = 1.
Proof. The equilibrium is truthful if and only if ∀ a g1(a) = q(a) and together with equation
(14), it holds:
q(a)an−2
(
s∑
k=3
(n− k)!(k − 2)!
(n− 2)!
αk
)
− α1a
n−1 =
∫ a
0
q(u)
(
s∑
k=3
αk(k − 2)(a− u)
k−3un−k
)
du.
(15)
If the distribution is uniform in [0, 1], then q(a) = a and by replacing the latter formula
becomes
α1 =
s∑
k=3
(k − 3)!(n− k)!(2k − n− 3)
(n− 2)!
αk.
Moreover we still have
∑s
k=1 αk = 1 and ∀ k αk > 0.
We can easily show that this intersection of two hyper plans with the portion of the space
of αk > 0 has an infinite number of solutions.
Next theorem characterizes the truthful equilibrium for general distribution.
Theorem 4.2. If F is a continuous and strictly increasing function on I = [0, 1] or I = [0,+∞)
and if it exists a truthful equilibrium different of second price auctions, then F corresponds to
the uniform distribution in [0, 1], i.e F (x) = x for x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. As F is continuous on I and strictly increasing, then q exists and is continuous on
J = [0, 1] or J = [0, 1). Moreover, we have q(0) = 0.
Then, with equation (15) we can easily deduce that q is infinitely differentiable on J \ {0}.
Moreover by differentiating (15) we can show that q′ is extendable by continuity in 0 and then
by differentiating an other time that q′′ is also extendable by continuity in 0.
With the variable change u = av and after simplifying by an−2, equation (15) becomes:
q(a)

 s∑
p=3
(n− p)!(p− 2)!
(n− 2)!
αp

− α1a =
∫ 1
0
q(av)

 s∑
p=3
αp(p− 2)(1− v)
p−3vn−p

 dv
(16)
Then, by deriving the equation (16) two times (the derivation under the integral sum is
valid because q is two times continuously differentiable) we find ∀ a ∈ I:
q′′(a)

 s∑
p=3
(n− p)!(p− 2)!
(n− 2)!
αp

 = ∫ 1
0
v2q′′(av)

 s∑
p=3
αp(p− 2)(1− v)
p−3vn−p

 dv. (17)
Moreover, according to lemma 5, we have:∫ 1
0
s∑
p=3
αp(p− 2)(1− v)
p−3vn−pdv =
s∑
p=3
(n− p)!(p− 2)!
(n− 2)!
.
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Supposing by the absurd that it exists x ∈ I such that q′′(x) 6= 0, and without loss of
generality q′′(x) > 0. By noting a0 such that q(a0) = maxI q(x) (or max[0,b] q(x) ∀ b ∈ (0, 1) if
I = [0, 1)) we have that the right hand side of (17) satisfies:
∫ 1
0
v2q′′(a0v)

 s∑
p=3
αp(p− 2)(1− v)
p−3vn−p

 dv < q′′(a0)

 s∑
p=3
(n− p)!(p− 2)!
(n− 2)!
αp

 ,
which is absurd because there is equality in (16).
Then ∀ a ∈ I, q′′(a) = 0 and we deduce that we necessarily have I = [0, 1] and such that
q(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1 we have q(a) = a which corresponds to an uniform distribution of the
valuation of the bidders.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we give an exact analytical solution of the k-price auctions. Moreover we introduce
a new type of auction which could replace the second price auctions. This article has led us to
interesting open questions that we list here:
1. Is it possible to find the exact analytical solution of the combination-auctions, i.e solve
the equation (11)?
2. Here we took constant coefficients αi. What happens if the αi becomes random variables
dependent, for example, on F ?
3. For a given F is it possible to find a combination such that α2 = 0 (or α2 6 r, r ∈ [0, 1))
and such that the Nash equilibrium of these combination-auctions noted g minimizes any
standard norm between g and the truthful one x 7→ x?
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